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INTRODUCTION 
 
Privatization was placed on Turkey’s economic policy agenda as early as mid-1980s.  At the 
time, privatization was seen as an important component of the structural adjustment process 
that was intended to move the economic policy regime away from the import substitution 
model that prevailed in the earlier decades towards a model where markets and the private 
sector would play a predominant role in economic activities.  Policymakers presented 
privatization as a way to increase overall efficiency of the economy, reduce public 
expenditures, transform what were seen as inefficient public enterprises, reduce the scope of 
the state, develop domestic capital markets and widen share ownership by the general public.   
 
Despite the rhetoric, though, there seems to be a general consensus that the Turkish 
experience with privatization in the 1980s and 1990s has not lived up to expectations. Indeed 
during this period privatization revenues have been quite low, of the order of about $500-600 
million per year (see Figure 1 below).  Several arguments have been proposed for this 
outcome, including weak commitment by coalition governments, disagreements among 
coalition partners about the desirability and scope of privatization, concern at the political 
level about loss of patronage opportunities, the ability of the étatist-minded state elite to use 
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the recourse to the constitutional court to launch legal challenges against privatization laws 
and that the general public was not yet altogether agreeable to the notion of privatization.2   
 
The privatization scene has changed significantly since the year 2000, and more dramatically 
since 2004.  A number of large enterprises have been privatized and more than $26 billion 
have been raised in privatization revenues between 2005-2008 (Figure 1).  Perhaps more 
importantly, privatization has moved to infrastructure industries such as telecommunications, 
electricity and ports.  These are industries with endemic problems of imperfect competition 
and market power and, from a public welfare point of view, pose special problems in terms of 
privatization policy.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess of Turkey’s recent experience with privatization.  The 
chapter will try to examine the factors that may explain the rapid increase in privatization 
activity and evaluate recent privatizations from a normative point of view.  The main 
conclusions of the chapter are as follows: First, by the end of the 1990s, a more or less 
coherent legal framework for privatization, consistent with the constitutional interpretations of 
the Constitutional Court was in place.  Second, the single-party governments of the 2000s 
were both more enthusiastic about privatization and had strong incentives, given the rigid 
fiscal adjustment that the country had to go through in the aftermath of the 2000-2001 crisis.  
Third, even though on paper privatization policy had a multitude of objectives, and even 
though in some industries (most notably electricity and telecommunications) privatization was 
accompanied by the development of a regulatory framework to prevent anti-competitive 
abuses, in practice the objective of revenue generation dominated privatization transactions 
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and long-term-productivity was given much lower priority.  In fact, governments have seen 
privatization-at-all-costs as a panacea in itself, and treated it as a substitute of good public 
policy at the sectoral level, especially in infrastructure industries. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows.  The next section will provide a brief overview of recent 
experience with privatizations.  Next, the chapter will summarize the evolution of the legal 
infrastructure of privatization.  The relation between competition policy, regulation and 
universal service obligations, and their role in privatizations will be discussed next.  The 
chapter will then present a more detailed analysis of privatizations in infrastructure industries.  
The last section will provide a summary assessment and conclude. 
 
RECENT EXPERIENCE 
 
Figure 1 presents the evolution of privatization revenues over time.  Until 2004, with a few 
exceptions discussed below, privatization revenues have been quite low, around or below $ 
500 million per year. Indeed, in the 1990s privatization consisted of manufacturing 
establishments primarily in the food, beverages, electronics, and cement industries.  In the 
1990s there were also a number of public offerings of large state-owned companies, 
comprising typically a small proportion of total equity (between 2-8 percent), including:  
Erdemir (steel, 1990), Petkim (petrochemicals, 1990), Tüpraş (refinery, 1991), Petrol Ofisi 
(retail gasoline, 1991).  However, the sale of controlling shares in these companies to the 
private sector took place in 2000 and after.  One exception was the year 1998, during which 
Etibank, a bank originally established to finance mining activities, was privatized in a block 
sale and government’s share in İş Bank was privatized through a public offering.   
 
FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE 
 
 
In 2000, another exceptional year, there were a few big ticket items.  One was the block sale 
of Asil Çelik which was a steel company originally owned by the Koç Group and taken over 
by the government when it fell into financial distress. The second was the block sale of Petrol 
Ofis, a gasoline retailer, and the public offering of 31 percent of the share of the petroleum 
refinery Tüpraş.  Table 1 gives the dates and sales values of privatization transactions with 
values over $ 100 million.  It also presents cases where the divestiture of a company was done 
in stages.   
 
TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
 
But the real sustained increase in privatization revenues started in 2004.  Privatization 
revenues exceeded $ 8 billion annually in 2005-2006 and averaged almost $5 billion in 2007-
2008.  The privatized companies were truly the state-owned giants of the economy, including 
Turkish Airlines, Tüpraş, Erdemir, Türk Telekom, the incumbent telecommunications 
operator, a number of ports including some of the largest in Turkey, electricity distribution 
companies and Tekel, the tobacco and cigarette company.  One should underline the recent 
move towards infrastructure facilities and companies engaged in the provision of what many 
countries regard as public services. 
 
Table 1 also indicates that, except for the case of Turkish Airlines, majority shares in most 
companies have been divested through block sales rather than public offerings.  As has been 
emphasized before (e.g. Karataş 2001), widening of share ownership, an objective that was 
heavily emphasized in the beginning of the privatization adventure seems to have been largely 
forgotten.  Even though this could be due to constraints imposed by underdeveloped and 
shallow capital markets, it could also reflect the governments’ desire to ensure the presence of 
strategic investors with secured control rights, that is, a non-dispersed form of corporate 
governance.  Especially in cases where the interests of the shareholders require that the 
company goes through significant restructuring, and that the influence of politically appointed 
insiders be reduced, dispersed ownership may hinder such changes and strengthen the current 
management instead. Lack of control rights, of course, would also potentially reduce the 
expected privatization revenues.  
  
EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
The evolution of the legal infrastructure for privatization provides interesting clues both about 
the politics of privatization and about reasons behind the contrasting performance between the 
1990s and 2000s. The first set of legislation on privatization of state-owned or affiliated assets 
were Law no. 2983 (“Law on the encouragement of savings and acceleration of public 
investments”) and decree with the force of law (Decree-Law for short) no. 233 (decree-law on 
state economic enterprises), both adopted in 1984.  The former authorized the administration 
to issue “revenue sharing certificates”, equity shares and operating rights on public facilities.  
It also created Mass Housing and Public Participation Board (MHPPB). Decree- Law 233, on 
the other hand, was really a piece of legislation that laid down a new legal and organizational 
framework for state owned enterprises, but article 38 identified various forms of divestiture 
(namely liquidation, transfer, sale and granting of operating rights).  These transactions would 
be carried out by the MHPPB.  Because of the inadequacy of these pieces of legislation, in 
1986 law no. 3291 was enacted.  This was the first law where the word privatization was 
explicitly used.  This law made the Council of Ministers responsible for the privatization 
decision of state economic enterprises (SEEs), and the MHPPB of organizations where SEEs 
had shareholdings. Law no. 3291 remained as the main privatization law until 1994.  
However, this law also suffered from a number of weaknesses.  It was primarily an 
amendment law, not a coherent privatization law.  Its provisions on privatization consisted 
merely of some 4 articles and they were very general.  The concepts used were vague and in 
implementation it turned out they were very inadequate.  Its provisions for the treatment of 
employees did not cover all employees of the enterprises under privatization and this created 
significant rigidity.  The whole process placed highly burdensome responsibilities on the 
agencies responsible for privatization for the governance of enterprises admitted into the 
divestiture process (Baytan 1999: 37, Celasun and Arslan, 2001:241). 
 
Governments tried to reassign decision making authorities on privatizations through a number 
of laws and decree-laws in the period 1990-1994.3  As a result of these, the legal basis of 
privatization became even more complex and disorganized.  In 1994 Turkey suffered from a 
severe currency crisis.  Right after the crisis, the government attempted to resolve the 
privatization quagmire through decree-laws and enacted the “enabling law” 3987.  This law 
did not address privatization directly, but intended to give the government the authority to 
issue decree-laws.  The government issued five decree-laws on the basis of Law 3987, on 
organizational issues as well as labor compensation schemes.  The law was taken to the 
Constitutional Court by the opposition party members and cancelled by the Constitutional 
Court. Finally, Law 4046, which still governs the privatization process in Turkey, was enacted 
in October 1994. 
                                                 
3 To be exact, four decree-laws (number 304, 414, 437 and 473) and one law (no. 3701) (Baytan 1999: 38).  Just 
to give an example of the degree of confusion, law No. 3701 was adopted on 6 March 1991, and was annulled 
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 The reason for revisiting this history is to underline the fact that governments in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s did spend quite a bit of effort to enact laws that would enable them to proceed 
with privatizations. However, the laws that they enacted looked for shortcuts rather then 
create a solid legal base for a privatization policy.4  The laws typically gave substantial 
discretionary authority either to the government or to administrative agencies, and provided 
little detail on definitions, procedures, methods to be used for privatizations, let alone taking 
into consideration potential problems that might arise in industries where market power 
existed.  They were designed to undertake privatizations in quite unaccountable and non-
transparent ways.  Perhaps more importantly, however, these efforts reflected an inadequate 
understanding of the legal complexities of privatization of state owned assets.  Either there 
was a steep learning curve to go through, or politicians and bureaucrats engaged in designing 
these laws lacked the capacity to comprehend and deal with these complexities or both. 
 
It is also interesting to review the main concerns raised by the Constitutional Court in its 
decision to cancel Law 3987.  The main points of the Court included the following (Atiyas 
and Oder 2005: 55-57).   
 
a)  Law 3987 gives the Council of Ministers the authority to issue decree-laws with almost no 
limitations.  This amounts to the delegation of legislative authority to the executive and is not 
constitutional. 
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b)  The transfer of control over public services that have strategic value such as 
telecommunications and electricity to foreigners is unconstitutional 
 
c)  The privatization of natural monopolies would create private monopolies.  This is 
unconstitutional.  In case of such privatizations, it is necessary to show what sort of measures 
will be undertaken so as to allow the state to exercise oversight and control. 
 
The first item reflects that the Constitutional Court would like to have the legislature specify 
ex-ante and in some detail the authorities of the executive and administrative agencies and the 
procedures they are going to use when they conduct privatizations.  Put differently, the 
Constitutional Court revealed a preference for less discretion and higher legal certainty at the 
executive and administrative levels.  The concern reflected in the second item has been met 
by allocating the government a “golden share” in privatizations where the government loses 
majority control of a strategic enterprise. Such golden share would give the government a say 
in and authority to approve critical decisions (say changes in the articles of association or 
mergers with other companies).5  The third item is perhaps the most interesting: it is simply 
stating that privatization of natural monopolies should be carried out only if a regulatory 
framework is established to curb the abuse of market power.  This, of course, is consistent 
with standard normative economic theory of privatization (see below). 
 
When the efforts to change the legal framework of privatization through decree laws was 
struck down by the Constitutional Court, the government finally put together and enacted Law  
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4046 (henceforth Privatization Law) which was a comprehensive and detailed law governing 
privatizations.6 
 
The Privatization Law went through some further changes before it reached its final form. 
Importantly, in a decision annulling some articles of the law, the Constitutional Court required 
that the determination of the details of tender and valuation methods should not be delegated 
to administrative agencies but should be specified in the law, reiterating its preference for less 
discretion mentioned above.  These details have been added to the law in 1997 through the 
adoption of Law 4232.  Hence by the end of the 1990s, after a long and convoluted process, a 
legal basis for a workable privatization policy, and more or less consistent with the 
constitutional interpretations of the Constitutional Court was established. 
 
 
PRIVATIZATION AND WELFARE: THE ROLE OF COMPETITION, 
REGULATION AND DISTRIBUTIONAL CONCERNS 
 
Privatization has been a controversial policy worldwide.  Survey results indicate, for example, 
that in Latin America initial support for privatization has decreased over time (Estache and 
Trujillo 2008: 137-8).   More generally, in many countries privatization has been criticized for 
their adverse distributional consequences (Roland 2008:1).  The literature that attempts to 
measure the effects of privatization provides mixed conclusions.  Initial estimates of large 
improvements in the performance of privatized enterprises seem to suffer from sample 
selection bias (more profitable firms are privatized first, hence efficiency gains may be 
resulting not from privatization but from the fact that they were efficient to begin with).  In 
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any case, one important conclusion that emerges from this literature is that in imperfectly 
competitive industries consequences of privatization critically depends on the institutional 
environment, especially in the existence of good regulation.   
 
Indeed, the most important consequence of privatization is likely to make firms more 
responsive to profits: that is, privatization encourages profit maximization.  Whether this is 
good or bad largely depends on market structure and the legal and institutional environment.  
It would be fair to say that economic theory would support a presumption that in the absence 
of market failures such as externalities, public goods, imperfect information and imperfect 
competition, and in the absence of distributional considerations (for example universal 
service) profit orientation would result in an increase in allocative and cost efficiency, and 
overall welfare. By contrast, the consequences of privatization are not obvious when either 
market imperfections exist or when social welfare includes distributional concerns, for 
example in the form of universal service obligations. 
Competition Policy vs. Regulation 
 
In the Turkish context, imperfect competition has been an important source of market failure 
that the privatization process has faced, especially in infrastructure industries such as 
telecommunications, electricity and ports.  One might question why the existence of imperfect 
competition should pose a special problem for privatization, as long as competition law exists 
and is effectively enforced in the country.  Indeed a legal and institutional framework for 
competition law enforcement does exist in Turkey.  The Law on The Protection of 
Competition was enacted in 1994 and the Competition Authority has been enforcing the law 
since 1997.  Moreover, competition law enforcement is one area of public policy where 
Turkey is regarded to be relatively successful.7  In fact, as will be discussed in more detail 
below, the role of the Competition Authority in privatizations in Turkey has been quite 
important thanks to procedural requirements that allow the Competition Board to voice its 
opinions and give it the authority to approve individual transactions (see below).  However, 
experience in many countries suggests that in a number of industries where severe problems 
of market power exist, governments have concluded that the ex-post competition policy 
enforcement is not sufficient to protect the public interest.  This is especially true in sectors 
such as electricity and telecommunications, where incumbent operators have monopoly 
ownership over an essential facility in the form of a network, which cannot be duplicated by 
new entrants in a reasonable time frame relevant for the development of competition, and to 
which new entrants into the industry require access. In such circumstances, most governments 
also establish a set of ex-ante regulations that require incumbent operators, among other 
things, to provide access in a non-discriminatory manner to potential entrants that compete 
with incumbents in downstream or retail markets.   
 
In the absence of such a regulatory framework, the transfer of ownership of network assets to 
private interests is likely to create serious market power problems and has in principle 
ambiguous, and most likely negative, welfare consequences.8  In fact, in such circumstances 
privatization should be seen as part of the regulatory framework and it needs to be undertaken 
in a manner which is consistent with the overall objectives of sectoral policy, which often 
entails the development of competition in the industry. 
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and management (such as soft budget constraints, patronage and clientelism, and the like) against inefficiencies 
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Universal Service 
 
The second general issue that needs to be addressed during privatization has to do with special 
arrangements that may need to be established to achieve possible distributional and social 
objectives.  Services such as electricity, telecommunications, water and transportation are 
subject to universal service requirements in most countries, that is, they are treated as services 
that all citizens should have access to and should be able to consume at reasonable prices 
irrespective of costs. 9  This may have two dimensions:  Providing these services may be too 
costly in some regions, for example, if this entails significant fixed costs and population in 
those regions is sparse.  Second, the incomes of some households may be too low to purchase 
these services at regular tariffs, that is, even when costs are not too different from national 
averages.  Such universal service considerations run counter to the logic of private enterprise 
and market competition and therefore require special regulatory arrangements.  Hence an 
important issue is to what extent the privatization procedure takes account of such 
considerations.   
The Role of the Turkish Competition Authority in Privatizations 
 
The Competition Board decided in 1998 that privatizations by public agencies are to be 
treated as merger and acquisition transactions and therefore need to be reviewed under merger 
provision (Article 7) of the Competition Law.10 The review of the Competition Authority in 
privatizations appears in two instances.  First, if the entity being privatized (1) has a market 
share over 20 percent, (2) has a turnover exceeding TRL 20 trillion (about €9.5 million)  (3) 
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possesses a legal monopoly, or (4) enjoys statutory or de facto privileges not accorded to 
private firms in the relevant market, then an advance notification needs to be provided to the 
Board before the tender is announced to the public, so that the Board can provide its views on 
the proper method of structuring sale of the privatization assets.  Second, to become legally 
effective, the privatization transaction requires a Board approval under the following 
conditions:  (1) where advance notification of the transaction was required, as explained 
above, or, (2) even if advance notification was not required, where the acquiring firm has a 
pre-transaction market share above 25 percent or turnover exceeding TRL 25 trillion (about 
€12 million). Hence in the first stage, the Competition Board can intervene by stating an 
opinion on the transaction, while at the second stage it effectively can make binding 
determinations which effectively puts it in the position of a veto authority.  
 
The review by the Competition Board in principle provides an important safeguard against 
privatizations that may enhance or create market power in the relevant markets.  Note, 
however, that the boundaries of the Board’s review are drawn by Article 7.  In other words, 
this is strictly a review that attempts to establish whether the transaction creates a dominant 
position or enhances an already existing dominant position.  Hence, this review in principle 
cannot compensate for inadequate or incompetent policy design (such as ex-ante sector 
specific regulation, measures that would be necessary to address other market imperfections 
or distributional concerns).  Moreover, a review under article 7 of the Competition law is a 
regular merger review: this means that, strictly speaking, the transfer of ownership of an 
existing public monopoly to private interests, a transaction that does not create a dominant 
position (as one already exists) or enhance an existing dominant position (given that 
competition law is ownership-blind) should survive under such a review.  In other words, 
strictly speaking, competition law does not provide an efficient instrument against 
transforming public monopolies into private monopolies.  From an international perspective, 
the Turkish case is quite unique in that the Competition Authority has created such a role for 
itself and that the rest of the administration has accepted it.  As will be seen below, in a 
number of instances this has prevented serious flaws in privatization policy as well as specific 
privatization transactions. 
 
In non-infrastructure industries, even though there are a number of decisions that has affected 
privatization policies, overall it can be said that the Board has taken a non-restrictive attitude 
towards privatization transactions (as will be discussed below, this has not been the case in 
infrastructure industries).  Some of the influential decisions are as follows:  
 
• In 2000, the purchase of IGSAS, a state firm that manufactured nitrogenous and 
composite fertilizers, by Toros Gübre, a private fertilizer company was not approved 
because transaction was deemed likely to create a dominant position. 
• In 2004 the Competition Board approved the sale of Tüpraş (a refinery) to a German 
subsidiary of a Tatarstan-based company, but noted that any new refining capacity 
investment by the firm would be assessed for entry deterrence effects on potential 
entrants into the refining market.11 
• In 2005, the Competition Board denied approval to three privatization transactions 
involving the purchase of cement plants sold by the Turkish Deposit Insurance Fund. 
In two of the cases the purchase was denied because it would create dominance, in the 
third case it was argued that the purchase would have created joint dominance.  Failure 
                                                 
11 This particular sale was later cancelled by an administrative court and, upon appeal, the cancellation was 
upheld by the Council of State (the high administrative appeals court). The cancellation decision was based on 
several justifications, including the following: a) the buyer did not provide all information requested by the 
tender specifications; b) there were only two potential buyers, hence there was insufficient competition, and c) 
the privatization method was negotiations rather than an auction, but the choice was not well justified. 
to approve meant that instead of the top winners of the tenders, those participants that 
came in second or third would purchase the plants.   
• In 2005 the granting of the transfer of operating rights (TOR) of the Iskenderun Port to 
the PSA-Akfen group was made conditional on the group not acquiring the TOR of 
the adjacent Mersin Port. The idea behind this condition was to ensure some degree of 
competition between these two ports by preventing control by a single operator.  
• In 2007 regarding the TOR of the Izmir port, the Board decided that the transfer of the 
operating rights to one of the contending groups (Alsancak Ortak Girişim Grubu) 
would likely result in the restriction of competition because one of the partners of the 
group was already a dominant player in the cargo handling business. 
 
The Competition Board’s interventions in the infrastructure industries will be examined in 
more detail below. 
  
PRIVATIZATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRIES 
Telecommunications 
 
Fixed line telecommunications is a prime example of a network industry.  Until 20-25 years 
ago, the industry was organized as a vertically integrated monopoly, under public ownership 
in most countries, or as a regulated private company in a few cases, most notably the US. 
Technological developments and the reduction in the prices of key electronic components 
made it possible to introduce competition into key segments of the industry.  While the local 
copper network is still considered as an essential facility, the emergence of alternative access 
technologies is starting to create opportunities for competition even there as well.  In any case, 
there is a global trend towards enhancing competition in the telecommunications industry.  
There is wide agreement that this, in turn, requires a set of ex-ante rules that constrain the 
market power of incumbent operators and that allows new entrants to have various forms of 
access to the existing network.  Privatization of the incumbent operator makes the existence 
and effective enforcement of such a regulatory framework all the more indispensable.  
 
Privatization of Türk Telekom, the incumbent operator in Turkey, was initially launched with 
almost no regard for such a regulatory framework.  Decree Law No. 509 (1993) intended to 
allow the government to transfer the rights to operate the company’s assets and sell up to 49 
percent of its shares.  This decree-law was cancelled by the Constitutional Court because the 
authorizing law had been cancelled.12  Turk Telekom was then established trough law no. 
4000.  However, a critical article of this law, which authorized the Ministry of Transport to 
determine the rules and procedures to sell 49 percent of TTAS’ shares, was cancelled by the 
Constitutional Court, on the basis that giving such authority to the Ministry amounted to a 
transfer of legislative authority to the executive and that such procedures had to be specified 
in law. Then Law No. 4107 was enacted in 1995 that enabled the privatization of up to 49 
percent of Turk Telekom; critical articles of this law were also cancelled by the Constitutional 
Court, basically because it gave too much discretion to the administration (in this case the 
Privatization High Council) in determining the valuation and sale conditions of Turk 
Telekom.  These challenges forced the governments to develop a less ad-hoc and more 
structured approach to privatization.  A new phase was launched with Law 4161 (1996), 
which established and a Value Assessment Committee which was also charged with 
developing sector policy.  This law was also taken to the Constitutional Court for 
                                                 
12 The Authorizing Law No 3911 gave wide powers to the government to issue decree-law in diverse fields 
including social security and privatization.  This law was cancelled by the Constitutional Court because, among 
other things, it amounted to transfer of lawmaking authority from the parliament to the executive.  
cancellation, but it survived the constitutional judicial review. This was followed in 2000 by 
the enactment of Law No. 4502 which envisaged the termination of Turk Telekom’s 
monopoly rights by 2003 and which established the Telecommunications Authority in charge 
of developing sector-specific regulations.   
 
The main policy objective in the telecommunications industry is or should be the development 
of a competitive market that may encourage lower prices, new products and services, 
technological developments and innovation.  In principle the privatization of the incumbent 
operator may serve as an important instrument to reach these overall objectives.  It may be 
expected that, provided that competition develops, private ownership may render the 
incumbent operator more flexible, more responsive to changing market conditions and better 
able to respond to the competitive challenges of new entrants.   In the case of Turkey, 
privatization was also seen as an important step towards the development of competition 
because many in the industry thought it might reduce the influence of Türk Telekom on the 
Ministry of Transport and level the playing field.  In effect, it is generally agreed that 
liberalization and the development of competition was derailed because of the prospective 
privatization of Turk Telekom.  The government was focused on the revenues that were to be 
generated through privatization, and therefore delayed the steps taken towards liberalization, 
in the hope that existence of monopoly rents would fetch higher privatization prices. In 
particular, there were significant delays in issuing new licenses, signing interconnection 
agreements and developing the necessary infrastructure (such as cost accounting) for effective 
regulation.  In retrospect, it was as if at the political level the development of a regulatory 
framework was seen as an instrument to make privatization legally feasible rather than vice 
versa.  Put differently, at the political level privatization was the main objective, not the 
development of competitive markets.13 
 
One should also take note of the role of competition policy in the privatization of the 
incumbent operator.  In its review of the privatization of Turk Telekom, the Board concluded 
that the sale of Turk Telekom should be conditioned upon a requirement that the purchaser 
divest the cable television operation to a different legal entity within one year after purchase, 
and that the Internet access operation be established as a separate (but wholly owned) entity 
within the divested company within six months after purchase. The Board further 
recommended that the dominant private sector GSM service provider not be allowed to 
participate in the tender.  Thus the cable TV assets were separated from Turk Telekom and 
were placed under the ownership of the state-owned satellite company.  The whole point of 
the Competition Board’s opinion was to ensure that the cable TV assets would be privatized 
separately and thereby the incumbent would face competition through the cable network.  
However, this privatization has not occurred yet.   
Electricity 
 
Privatization is a crucial component of the reform and restructuring program that is being 
conducted in the electricity industry.  The legal basis of the program is Law No. 4628 
(Electricity Market Law, later changed to Energy Market Law or EML) that was enacted in 
2001.  The law envisaged the formation of competitive electricity markets and established the 
Electricity Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) to oversee the development of competition, 
                                                 
13 This is not to say that the regulatory framework that eventually emerged was a sham.  On the contrary, with 
almost no help from the Ministry, the Telecommunications Authority put out a series of secondary legislation 
that made the rules of the game in Turkey converge (albeit slowly and incompletely) towards those in the 
European Union.   
and to design and enforce necessary regulations for access as well as the tariffs of the non-
competitive segments.  Before examining the role of privatization in the restructuring 
program, it will be informative to review briefly earlier attempts at attracting private sector 
investments into the industry.  
 
The government’s earlier effort for privatization in electricity entailed attracting private 
capital through build-operate-transfer (BOT), build operate (BO) and transfer of operating 
rights (TOR) contracts.14  In 1991 the Council of Ministers authorized some companies to 
engage in generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in their respective regions.  
These were exclusive arrangements with no consideration of competitive markets.  Moreover, 
the authorizations themselves were done without any competitive tendering procedure (hence 
there was no competition in the market or for the market). In 1996 these authorizations were 
cancelled by the Council of Ministers. The companies appealed at the Council of State 
(Danıştay, the high appeals court for administrative decisions) and won.  With the move 
towards a competitive model in 2001, this situation created a legal confusion that continues to 
this day. 15  In 1996 the government launched a new round of privatizations of distribution 
companies under the TOR model.  Bids were collected for 25 distribution regions.  Bids for 
five regions were found insufficient, and five regions faced various forms of legal problems.  
The agreements of an additional four were annulled by the Council of state and ultimately 11 
signed concession agreements which were approved by the Council of State.  However, these 
agreements were not implemented.  EML envisaged that these agreements would be amended 
so that they would be suited to the market model adopted.  The supplementary articles of the 
                                                 
14 See Atiyas and Dutz (2005) for a discussion of these contracts. 
15 One of these companies, AYDEM, was recently reported to renew its agreement with the Ministry and obtain 
a TOR for distribution.  In effect, the company has relinquished its exclusivity rights under the old agreements 
and agreed to be subject to price and other regulations of EMRA as well as a competitive regime in retail supply.  
See the daily Referans, March 22, 2008. 
law putting time limits for these amendments were cancelled by the constitutional court.  
Following the enactment of law 4628, a Strategy Document (discussed in more detail below) 
issued by the High Planning Council in 2004 redesigned the distribution regions and created 
21 distribution regions, 20 of which were to be privatized.16  In short, the legal status of these 
TOR contracts are extremely vague.17 
 
The important aspect of these TORs was that they gave complete exclusivity to the 
distribution companies. The bids during the tender were on the distribution tariffs, with the 
lowest bid winning (OECD, 2002, p. 17).  Then these bids were to be used to calculate tariffs 
which would be then determined for the duration of the contract.  There was also a transfer 
fee, fixed in advance that the winning company would pay the government. Hence, the TOR 
contracts were designed without any room for competition in the market and with no 
mechanism that would allow consumers to benefit from any future efficiency gains.  This was 
noted by the Competition Board in its opinion dated 1998 (decision no. 98-87/693-138): The 
Board stated that exclusivity clauses should be removed, the distribution business separated 
from retail supply and that instead of fixing tariffs for the duration of the contracts (which was 
going to be 30 years), that the companies should be free to set tariffs within minimum and 
maximum prices set by a regulatory authority or the relevant Ministry (inthis case the 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources), and that the concession agreement should entail a 
requirement of non-discrimination (Karakelle, 2000, Competition Authority, n.d.).  The 
Ministry responded by stating that under the prevailing legal framework it was not possible to 
do these.   
 
                                                 
16 The remaining one is Kayseri.  This is really a special case and has been under a concession agreement on and 
off since the 1920s. 
17 For discussions of the TOR experience in Turkey, see Ulusoy (2005), OECD (2002) and Competition 
Authority (n.d.) 
There is now general agreement that development of competition in the electricity industry is 
extremely difficult, if possible at all, if transmission and distribution activities, which display 
natural monopoly characteristics, are not separated from generation and retail supply which, 
are potentially competitive.18  Such separation would ensure that network operators do not 
have incentives to foreclose markets to downstream competitors in generation or retail 
supply.19 There are various degrees of separation, but legal separation (i.e. organizing 
different activities under different legal entities which may however belong to the same 
group) seems to be a minimum requirement. The EU has been pushing for ownership 
separation of transmission activities, which means that companies engaged in transmission 
cannot have any control relations in companies engaged in other activities in the electricity 
industry. Under the EML, transmission is to remain under government ownership. The EML 
also put some restrictions on the amount of electricity that a distribution company could 
procure from affiliated generation companies.  Different accounts needed to be kept for 
distribution and retail supply activities (accounting separation) but there was no legal 
separation.  
 
Later, a law passed in 2005 removed all restrictions on distribution companies to engage in 
retail sales and generation thus allowing vertical integration subject to accounting separation.  
This was widely interpreted as a move by the government to increase the attractiveness of the 
distribution assets which were going to be privatized (for example, Sevaioğlu, 2005).  This 
was a serious regression from the EML and was indicating either that the development of a 
competitive industry was not a main concern or that the Ministry of Energy did not really 
understand the necessary conditions for such a development to take place.   
                                                 
18  Retail supply typically includes activities such as billing, metering as well as designing tariff packages that 
would suit different consumer profiles.   
19 The main problem here is not price discrimination, which can be controlled by tariff regulation, but non-price 
discrimination, which has turned out to be much more difficult to detect and prevent through regulation. 
 What was the main concern of the government, then? For one thing, it is likely that the 
government wanted to get as high revenues as possible, and therefore decorated the 
distribution assets with monopoly rents, possibly underestimating the welfare costs associated 
with increased market power.  There was possibly a second reason, which was to minimize 
the risk that the distribution companies could not be privatized.  The strategy of the reform 
program was that the distribution companies would be privatized first and the privatization of 
generation assets would follow after privatization of distribution assets are almost completed.  
According to the strategy document mentioned above:20 “Since the distribution companies, 
holding retail licenses and operating in a liberal market, have to create confidence on 
investors engaged or to be engaged in generation activities, privatization will start in the 
distribution sub-sector.”  Hence the whole success for the reform program was contingent on 
the successful privatization of distribution assets. 
 
Common wisdom about liberalization and regulation would be perplexed by this strategy: 
One would have expected that if competition is at all an important objective, then the 
restructuring program should have opted for the horizontal break-up of generation assets and 
their privatization rather than the privatization of the monopoly segments!  The stated reason 
for the choice of the government was that if distribution companies were to remain under 
government ownership, they would not constitute credible buyers for electricity sold by 
private generation companies.  A related theme here was that public managers would be very 
reluctant to sign contracts with private generators because of the public uproar against the 
BOT and BO projects of the late 1990s.   
 
                                                 
20 Available at http://www.oib.gov.tr/program/2004_program/2004_electricity_strategy_paper.htm. Downloaded 
20 September 2008. 
It was up to the Competition Authority to upset this arrangement which would have opened 
the way for the creation of vertically integrated near-monopolies that would have strong 
incentives to foreclose markets in the future.  In its opinion on the privatization of the 
distribution companies (Competition Authority, n.d.), the Competition Board stated that the 
Strategy Document seemed to emphasize security of supply and attraction of foreign capital to 
the neglect of institution of competition and consumers’ interests.  The Competition Board 
also stated that the first best approach would be to have ownership separation between 
distribution activities on the one hand and generation and retail supply on the other.  Short of 
that, the Board stated that legal separation by the end of a transition period (effectively 2011) 
would be a condition for the approval of privatizations.  The condition of legal separation was 
explicitly stated in the tender specifications. 
 
In any case, the privatization of the distribution companies has been seriously delayed.  The 
strategy document has envisaged that by 2006 most of the 22 regional companies would have 
been privatized.  As of October 2008, tenders for only four of the 20 distribution companies 
have taken place.  
 
Ports21 
 
Ports are characterized by large and long lasting sunk costs, strong economies of density and 
economies of scale.  At the same time, ports provide a multitude of services with different 
characteristics.  It is generally believed that these differences allow for unbundling between 
activities and introduction of competition in some segments.   
 
                                                 
21 Information on the Turkish port industry and its privatization can be found in Günaydın (2006) and 
Competition Authority (2005a). 
Privatization of ports in Turkey has taken the form of TORs.  Some smaller size ports under 
the control of Turkish Maritime Administration (Türkiye Denizcilik İşletmeleri) were 
privatized between 1998 and 2003.  Then in 2004 the Privatization High Council has decided 
to include in the privatization portfolio six ports under the control of the Turkish State 
Railways Administration (TCDD).  These are the largest ports in Turkey in terms of capacity, 
connection to railways and highways, infrastructure facilities and hinterland.  In its opinion on 
the privatizations, for some of the ports the Competition Board (Competition Authority, 
2005b) listed several structural measures that would prevent the creation of dominant 
positions.  These measures included making room for within-port competition by transferring 
operating rights to two groups rather than one.22  In the end, the operating rights of each port 
were sold to a single operator.  According to the Competition Board, as expressed in its 
decisions approving these transactions, instead of taking the structural measures proposed in 
the Competition Board’s opinion, the Privatization Administration (PA) opted for restricting 
potential abuse of dominant position through clauses in the concession contract that would 
limit discrimination, excessive pricing or limiting supply, and require the operator to adopt 
cost accounting measures.23  The contract would be enforced and monitored by the Railways 
Authority.  Apparently the Competition Board found these measures adequate. 
 
This is an example of “regulation by contract”, whereby a regulatory arrangement is 
established through the means of a contract which specifies the rules and conduct limitations 
imposed on the operator over the duration of the contract.  However, there are a number of 
problems with this kind of an arrangement.  First, it is not clear at all whether the Railways 
                                                 
22 The staff recommendation to the Board had gone a step further and proposed unbundling of piloting and 
towing services form the rest of port services and privatizing these services in a separate tender (Competition 
Authority, 2005a) 
23 See, for example, Board Decision No. 05-58/855-231 on the Mersin Port and No. 07-47/507-182 on the Izmir 
Port. 
Authority would have the capacity to monitor and enforce the regulatory components of the 
contract.  Regulatory oversight requires resources and specific skills that the Railways 
Authority does not normally have.  In fact, the development of such skills and capacity is one 
of the main reasons why many countries have opted for the “independent regulatory agency” 
model to regulate and oversee development of competition in infrastructure industries. 
Second, the arrangement is completely non-transparent.  The concession contract itself is not 
a public document.  How prices are going to be regulated, for example, has not been disclosed 
to the public and therefore is not transparent.  Irrespective of whether enforced by an 
independent agency or a division in a ministry, the advantage of having an open regulatory 
framework governed by primary and secondary legislation is that it provides some degree of 
accountability and transparency to the process; transparency, in turn, is expected to enhance 
the quality of regulations and their enforcement.  The legislation on ports is extremely old, 
and the recent privatizations were carried out without a sector specific legal framework that 
would clarify the responsibilities of the different parties and how disputes may be resolved in 
case they arise.   
 
In short, it is not clear whether the government has a port policy at all.  What seems to be 
happening is that instead of designing a port policy, and a regulatory framework that would 
guide the implementation of that policy, the government has seen privatization as the single 
panacea to the problems of the port industry.  
Universal service  
 
As discussed above, liberalization and privatization have made universal service obligations 
important in both telecommunications and electricity industries, since the functioning of the 
market mechanism, even when a reasonable degree of competition is attained, does not ensure 
that all citizens will have access to basic telephone or electricity services at reasonable tariffs.   
 
In Turkey, in the case of the telecommunications industry, this issue has been addressed 
through the enactment of a Universal Service Law in 2005. Until the enactment of the law, 
Türk Telekom was responsible for implementing universal service obligations. According to 
the law, universal service includes public telephony basic internet and directory services. The 
basic logic of the law, which is consistent with the approach in the European Union, is that the 
provision of universal services will be organized in a competitive fashion, and operators 
which provide universal services will be compensated on the basis of the net incremental cost 
of the services provided. However, the law has not been applied yet, and effectively Türk 
Telekom is the monopoly provider of universal services.   
 
Affordability has been an even more important problem in the case of restructuring in the 
electricity industry. The problem is aggravated by interregional differences in transmission 
and distribution losses and theft of electricity.  In some regions losses surpass 50 percent of 
consumption. This means that current tariffs entail significant cross-subsidies and that any 
tariff that would reflect underlying costs would be prohibitively high in the poorest regions of 
Turkey.  Moreover, with rising energy costs cost-reflective tariffs are likely to generate 
significant energy poverty among low income households in all regions of Turkey 
(Bağdadioğlu et. al. 2007).  The EML had a specific provision for possible support for such 
households directly from the budget.  However, this clause was later cancelled and the 
government instead chose to continue with cross-subsidies.  The government also refused to 
raise tariffs in the face of rapidly increasing costs until recently, presumably in part due to 
concerns about distributional consequences.  However, this turned out to be fundamentally 
inconsistent with the basic market design and with the basic policy objective of the 
restructuring program, which was to attract new private investment into the industry.  In fact, 
unable to compete with subsidized retail prices of the public distribution companies, some 
private generators closed shop.  While the launching of a short term balancing market in 
August 2006 has provided a temporary solution to this problem, lack of investment in the 
interim period has created capacity constraints, driving up wholesale prices, and creating 
significant losses in the distribution company.  A more economically meaningful approach 
would have been to design an explicit and consistent universal service policy, funded directly 
from the budget and rely less heavily on distorting retail prices. 
 
A CONCLUDING ASSESSMENT 
 
It has often been argued that governments in the 1980s and 1990s did not seriously pursue 
privatization because they did not want to lose control over assets that they could use for 
political patronage and clientelism.   The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that this 
was not always true.  In fact, quite a number of governments did want to pursue privatization 
but in a non-transparent and non-accountable way.  These efforts simply did not meet the 
legal standards set by the Constitutional Court.  Note that from a political-economics point of 
view, losing control over assets is not without benefits: revenues generated through 
privatization can be used for patronage and clientelism-related expenditures as well.24   
 
                                                 
24 In fact, the act of privatization itself may be and instrument of rent seeking and rent allocation (Schamis, 
2002).  See Ercan and Onis (2001: 120) and Karakas (2001: 110) for Turkish examples of such cases of 
privatizations in the 1990s.  In the 2000s, two incidents drew wide public commentary (among others): The first 
one was the sale of a media company to the Çalık Group, owned by the Prime Minister’s son in law following a 
tender where the group faced no competitors.  It later turned out that the group was to finance the purchase 
through credits obtained from state owned banks.  The second incident was related to Doğan Group’s (a media 
concern also active in energy) application for a license to build a refinery in Ceyhan, a southern region of 
Turkey.  The owner of the Doğan Group claimed that the Prime Minister told him that he could not establish the 
refinery in Ceyhan because the Prime Minister promised to allocate the area to the Çalık Group. 
A few factors seem to have contributed to the rapid increase in privatization in the 2000s.  
The first factor has to do with the legal framework.  By the end of the 1990s a more or less 
coherent legal framework for privatization was established.  Moreover, for the 
telecommunications and electricity industries there was by the year 2001 a legal framework 
for the regulation of incumbent operators with monopoly power to ensure non-discriminatory 
access regimes.  The establishment of regulatory authorities with substantial discretion on a 
wide range of issues including tariffs, access and licensing also must have made privatization 
somewhat easier by addressing concerns about possible adverse consequences on social 
welfare.  
 
One should note that this did not mean that individual privatization transactions did not meet 
legal challenges.  In fact, many transactions were cancelled by administrative courts or the 
Council of State.  Even though a thorough assessment of these cases is very difficult since a 
lot of the information is not in the public domain, a review undertaken by Atiyas and Oder 
(2008) of some of the Council of State decisions suggests that some of these cancellations had 
legal/technical reasons, some seem to have occurred because of the way the cases were 
handled by the privatization agency, some got cancelled because the Council of State was 
unhappy and overcautious about (the lack of) investment requirements imposed by the 
administration.  In some cases (Petkim is a striking example, see Atiyas and Oder 2008: 144-
45), different divisions of the Council of State reached radically different conclusions.  
However, it is also very clear that there was significant learning involved.  Some cases which 
got cancelled by the Council in the first round nevertheless survived the second round because 
the PA could address the concerns raised by the Court. 
 
The availability of a legal framework removes barriers to privatization, that is, of course, if 
the government is willing to privatize.  Clearly the AKP governments that came to power in 
2002, soon after the 2001 crisis, showed a strong preference for privatization.  What could 
explain this preference?  The extremely high level of public debt that the government 
inherited from the crisis, and the consequent necessary fiscal adjustment, must have provided 
strong incentives for privatization.  As explained in detail in Ersel (2008), interest payments 
on debt severely curtailed the volume of current expenditures.  The government must have 
been aware that reducing the level of public debt by privatization revenues would eventually 
create flexibility in current expenditures (which was indeed created somewhat after 2005, see 
Ersel (2008)) without jeopardizing fiscal policy significantly.  In fact, obtaining revenues was 
not the only fiscal objective related to privatizations.  The other important objective was 
mobilizing the private sector to undertake necessary investments in infrastructure, which 
would also help reduce the burden of the fiscal adjustment and create flexibility in current 
expenditures. 
 
The fact that post-crisis governments were single party governments must have helped as 
well.  As discussed in Ercan and Öniş (2001), coalition governments are susceptible to 
fragmentation in the policy making process.  In that sense single-party majority governments 
are expected to be able to produce more coherent public policy although the experience with 
electricity liberalization in Turkey shows that single party governments are also not immune 
from substantial incoherence in public policy.  
 
Opposition to privatization policies by trade unions continued in the 2000s, if not as strongly 
as in the earlier period.  One of the most frequent tools used by trade unions was to challenge 
administrative decisions (for example, by the Privatization Authority) pertaining to 
privatization by taking them to administrative courts or the Council of State and requesting 
their cancellation.  As discussed above, this strategy lost effectiveness over time, possibly 
because the Privatization Authority improved its competence in addressing concerns raised 
during these legal challenges.   
 
From a more normative perspective, one may conclude first of all that in Turkey fiscal 
considerations of the sort described above have always dominated considerations regarding 
improvements in long term productivity.  In more than one case, a drive to increase the 
attractiveness of the assets to be privatized and therefore to maximize sale revenues have led 
governments to delay or neglect measures that were necessary to encourage the development 
of competition.  Even in the case of electricity, where privatization was apparently treated as 
part of a larger package of restructuring and liberalization, the whole process was dominated 
by privatization.25  At a more general level, it seems that the government has seen 
privatization as a general panacea, and as an excuse to free itself from the task of developing 
good public policy.   
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